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RACIAL FAIRNESS IN THE CRIMINAL




There are many complex reasons for the unwarranted racial
disparities that plague the American criminal justice system,1 but
* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law.
B.A. Howard University; J.D., Harvard Law School; former Director of the Public
Defender Service for the District of Columbia. The author thanks Molly Hostetler
and Elizabeth Janelle for their research assistance. The ideas in this article were
presented at the symposium entitled "Pursuing Racial Fairness in the
Administration of Justice: Twenty Years After McCleskey v. Kemp," held by the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund and Columbia Law School on
March 2-3, 2007.
1. See, e.g., David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American
Criminal Justice System (1999) (exploring how race and class-based double
standards in the criminal justice system allow a privileged few to enjoy
constitutional protections at low cost); Milton Heumann & Lance Cassak, Good
Cop, Bad Cop: Racial Profiling and Competing Views of Justice (2003) (discussing
the impact of the practice of profiling on racial and ethnic minorities); Marc
Mauer, Race to Incarcerate (2d ed. 2006) (exploring the impact of mass
incarceration on the "underclass"); Racial Issues in Criminal Justice: The Case of
African Americans (Marvin D. Free, Jr., ed., 2003) (discussing the enormous
racial disparities in the criminal justice system from academic research on crime
and media portrayals to the application of capital punishment); Katheryn K.
Russell, The Color of Crime: Racial Hoaxes, White Fear, Black Protectionism,
Police Harassment, and Other Macroaggressions (1998) (focusing on the criminal
image projected onto blacks by the media, the criminal justice system, racial
hoaxes, and misrepresented research); Rebecca Marcus, Racism in Our Courts:
The Underfunding of Public Defenders and Its Disproportionate Impact upon
Racial Minorities, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 219 (1994) (discussing the
disadvantages that racial minorities face in criminal justice due to inadequate
resources of public defender services); Mark D. Rosenbaum & Daniel P. Tokaji,
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one of the most significant contributing factors is the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, especially at the charging and plea
bargaining stages of the process. Few prosecutors consciously favor
criminal defendants or victims based on race or class.2 Most
prosecutors are motivated by a desire to enforce the law in ways that
will produce justice for everyone in the communities they serve.
However, all too often, prosecutors' well-intentioned charging and
plea bargaining decisions result in dissimilar treatment of similarly
situated victims and defendants, sometimes along race and class
lines.3
Unwarranted racial disparities cannot be eliminated without
the active participation of prosecutors. Prosecutors, along with other
criminal justice officials, must be willing to acknowledge the role
Healing the Blind Goddess: Race and Criminal Justice, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1941
(2000) (reviewing David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the Criminal
Justice System (1999)) (discussing the "massive and flagrant abuses" of law
enforcement officers and their disparate effect on racial minorities); Developments
in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1472 (1988)
(examining the problem of race discrimination within the criminal justice system
due to police misconduct, prosecutorial discretion, jury selection and misconduct,
and sentencing).
2. This Article focuses on racial disparities, but class and socio-economic
status are both relevant to the treatment of criminal defendants and victims of
crime. From the police, prosecutors, lawyers, judges, and other officials who run
the system to the defendants and victims who are drawn into it unwillingly, the
behavior and treatment of almost everyone involved in the criminal justice
process reflect the complexities of race and class. For a discussion of the relevance
of both race and socio-economic status to discriminatory behavior by criminal
justice officials, see Derrick Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for
Racial Justice 5 (1987) (noting that "race-related disadvantages" are "now as
likely to be a result as much of social class as of color"); Michael Tonry, The
Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 37, 62-63
(2005) (discussing the racial disparities resulting from the use of sentencing
policy to achieve personal, ideological, or partisan goals); Angela J. Davis, It's
Class and Race, Wash. Post, Nov. 25, 1995, at A19 (arguing that both race and
class discrimination exist in the criminal justice system). It is often difficult to
discern whether discrimination is based on race, class, or both. First, the number
of Americans living in poverty are disproportionately African-American, and
African Americans are disproportionately poor. See Sheldon Danziger & Peter
Gottschalk, America Unequal 73-74 (1995) (discussing data showing the
disproportionate rate of African-American poverty). Second, because
discrimination is often unintentional or unconscious, and thus unacknowledged,
its origin is sometimes difficult to discern. See infra Part I.
3. Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of
Discretion, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 13, 34-35 (1998).
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they play in contributing to these disparities and agree to institute
reform measures. Yet actually securing the cooperation of
prosecutors in such an effort will, for a variety of reasons, be a
challenging undertaking. Prosecutors traditionally have resisted
even modest efforts to reform the way that they perform their duties
and responsibilities.4 Because most prosecutors are elected officials,
their constituents must view the issue as a high priority and insist
upon prosecutorial action. The public, inundated by one-sided images
of prosecutors in the news and popular media, and bereft of
information about some of the most important functions that
prosecutors perform, does not view prosecutorial reform as a priority.
Thus, education and advocacy are needed to secure the support of
prosecutors and their constituents. Even if this support is secured,
legislation may be necessary to ensure that needed reforms are
implemented.
Any proposal for reform that is based on allegations of racial
bias will be met with particular resistance. It is doubtful that many
prosecutors will take responsibility for contributing to racial
disparities in the criminal justice system, even as an unintended
consequence of their race-neutral charging and plea bargaining
decisions. In addition, the ability of prosecutors to resist reform will
be enabled by Supreme Court decisions that have shielded
prosecutorial decisions from scrutiny in a variety of contexts,
including in cases where there has been a claim of discrimination
based on race.5
Almost ten years ago, in an article entitled Prosecution and
Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion,6 I proposed the use of
racial impact studies in prosecutors' offices as a way to advance the
nondiscriminatory exercise of discretion and to reduce racial
disparities in the criminal justice system. Since that time, there has
been increased awareness of the role that prosecutors play in
perpetuating these disparities. Criminal justice organizations and
4. See Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American
Prosecutor 155-57 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (discussing how the Citizens
Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 530(b) (Supp. IV 1998), was widely opposed by federal
prosecutors); Allan Van Fleet, Full Contact v. No Contact: How Government
Lawyers Tilt the Ethical Playing Field, Antitrust, Fall 1998, at 13, 16 (noting the
dissatisfaction of the Justice Department and federal prosecutors with the
Citizens Protection Act).
5. See discussion of ineffective legal remedies infra Part III.A.
6. Davis, supra note 3.
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institutions also have urged prosecutors to take responsibility for
how their decisions contribute to racial disparities, and have taken a
leadership role in helping to eliminate them.7
In this Article, I discuss developing efforts to involve
prosecutors in the elimination of racial disparities in the criminal
justice system. In Part II, I discuss how prosecutors unintentionally
contribute to disparities through the arbitrary, unsystematic exercise
of discretion. In Part III, I argue that the U.S. Supreme Court has
failed to provide an effective legal remedy for victims of race-based
selective prosecution. Finally, in Part IV, I endorse the use of racial
impact studies and task forces and discuss a model reform effort
spearheaded by the Vera Institute of Justice.
II. THE RACIAL IMPACT OF RACE-NEUTRAL DECISION-MAKING
Prosecutors exercise a tremendous amount of discretion in
charging and plea bargaining processes with no external oversight
and very little accountability to the constituents they serve. Charging
and plea bargaining decisions frequently predetermine the outcome
of criminal cases, especially in cases involving mandatory minimum
sentences! Since over ninety-five percent of criminal cases are
resolved with guilty pleas, 9 the impact of prosecutorial discretion
cannot be understated.
Police officers also exercise a great amount of discretion when
making arrests. 0 As such, the police contribute to unwarranted
racial disparities. Consequently, scholars have rightly focused much
7. See discussion of American Bar Association Commission on Effective
Criminal Sanctions and Vera Institute of Justice Prosecution and Racial Justice
Project infra Parts III.B, III.D.
8. See Charles W. Thomas & W. Anthony Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision
Making, 13 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 507, 510-11 (1976) (evaluating the powerful
impact of prosecutorial discretion at the charging and plea bargaining stages).
9. U.S. Dep't of Justice Bureau of Statistics, Felony Defendants in Large
Urban Counties, 2000 iv (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
fdluc00.pdf.
10. See Rosenbaum & Tokaji, supra note 1, at 1942 (discussing the
.massive and flagrant abuses" of law enforcement officers and their disparate
effects on racial minorities); David A. Harris, The Reality of Racial Disparity in
Criminal Justice: The Significance of Data Collection, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs.
71, 74-78 (2003) (detailing the role of data collection and police participation in
the problem of racial discrimination).
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attention on the problem of racial profiling." However, although
police officers bring individuals into the system with the arrest
power, only prosecutors have the power to formally charge them with
crimes-a power that often predetermines their fate.
Prosecutors can, and frequently do, decide not to charge
individuals who have been arrested, even if there is probable cause to
believe they have committed a crime. This decision is completely
within their discretion. If they do decide to charge, prosecutors have
complete discretion in deciding what crime or crimes to charge and
are restrained only by the criminal codes of their jurisdictions. The
proliferation of criminal statutes, both state and local, only expands
their discretion. Legislators pass laws that criminalize a vast array of
behaviors, and frequently these laws are duplicative. However,
prosecutors are not required to exercise their charging discretion in
any particular manner. There is no requirement, for example, that
prosecutors charge similarly situated 12 individuals with the same
offenses.
Most prosecutors would vehemently deny that they take race
into account in any way in the exercise of their prosecutorial duties,
and most probably do not consciously consider race. Nonetheless,
prosecutors rely on legitimate, race-neutral factors that sometimes
have racial effects. The American Bar Association (ABA) Standards
for the Prosecution Function have endorsed several such factors. 13 A
report to the ABA noted that legitimate factors include: the
seriousness of the offense, the defendant's prior criminal record, the
11. See David A. Harris, Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial Profiling Cannot
Work (2002) (discussing the harmful effects of racial profiling on minority
individuals and communities and its ineffectiveness as a policing tool); Andrew J.
Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect: From Elian to the Internment,
70 Fordham L. Rev. 2257, 2270 n.81 (2002) (stating that racial profiling violates
the principles of a "jurisprudence of respect"); Tracy Maclin, Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333, 354-362 (1998) (arguing that pretextual
traffic stops on the basis of race should constitute a violation of the Fourth
Amendment); Jeremiah Wagner, Racial (De)Profiling: Modeling a Remedy for
Racial Profiling After the School Desegregation Cases, 22 Law & Ineq. 73, 95
(2004) (proclaiming that racial profiling is a form of segregation).
12. A "similarly situated" defendant would have a similar criminal record
and the facts and circumstances of his case and alleged involvement in the crime
would be of a similar magnitude.
13. See ABA, Criminal Justice Section Standards: Prosecution Function,
Standard 3-3.9(b), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pfunc
blk.html#3.9 (last visited Oct. 26, 2007).
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victim's interest in prosecution, the strength of the evidence, the
likelihood of conviction, and the availability of alternative
dispositions.
14
The factor that many prosecutors consider most important is
the seriousness of the offense: the more serious the offense, the more
likely the prosecutor will charge the accused. For example, a
prosecutor may decide to dismiss a simple assault while zealously
pursuing the prosecution of an aggravated assault involving serious
injury. Few would question this decision, regardless of the race of the
defendant or victim. The more difficult issue arises when two
defendants are charged differently in cases involving similar facts,
except with defendants or victims of different races. At this point, the
issue of unconscious racism becomes relevant. If, for example, a
defendant in a case involving a white victim is charged with capital
murder while a similarly situated defendant in a case involving a
black victim is charged with second-degree murder, questions arise
about the value the prosecutors placed on the lives of the respective
victims. A prosecutor may unconsciously consider a case involving a
white victim as more serious than a case involving a black victim,
15
and this may influence the charging, plea bargaining, and other
related decisions.
1 6
If a prosecutor initially deems a particular case to be more
serious than others, she will invest more time and resources
investigating the case and preparing for trial. This will yield more
evidence, making it less likely that the prosecutor will offer a plea
bargain and more likely that she will succeed in obtaining a
conviction at trial. The likelihood of conviction is another
consideration endorsed by the ABA.17 Thus, although the strength of
14. ABA, Justice Kennedy Commission, Reports with Recommendations to
the ABA House of Delegates 58 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/
crimjust/kennedy/JusticeKennedyCommissionReportsFinal.pdf.
15. See Martha A. Myers and John Hagan, Private and Public Trouble:
Prosecutors and the Allocation of Court Resources, 26 Soc. Probs. 439, 447 (1979)
(stating that "regardless of the race of the defendant, prosecutors may consider
white victims more credible than black victims or their troubles more worthy of
full prosecution").
16. Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 327 (1987) (analyzing
unconscious racism and defining it, at its core, as "unconscious beliefs and
attitudes about race").
17. See American Bar Ass'n, supra note 14, at 58.
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the evidence and the likelihood of conviction are facially race-neutral
factors, they may be influenced by initial, unconscious racial
valuations. 8
The victim's interest in prosecution is another factor that
prosecutors legitimately consider in making charging and plea
bargaining decisions.' 9 If the victim of a crime has no interest in the
prosecution of his case and no desire to see the defendant punished,
the prosecutor may dismiss the case based on these views, especially
if the prosecutor believes that the defendant does not pose a danger
to society and that there are no other legitimate reasons for pursuing
the prosecution.2 0 Few would question this decision, especially if the
victim of the crime considered the prosecution process too onerous
and difficult.2'
On the other hand, should a prosecutor pursue a prosecution
in a case that she would otherwise dismiss for legitimate reasons
simply because the victim demonstrates an interest in prosecution?
22
Or should a prosecutor assume that a victim is not interested in
prosecution when the victim does not appear for witness conferences
or respond to a subpoena?23 Prosecutors are more likely to pursue
prosecutions in cases involving crime victims who are comfortable
navigating the criminal process and who have time to attend grand
jury hearings, witness conferences, and status hearings. The poor,
who are disproportionately people of color, are less able to take time
off from work to attend these hearings. They may also feel less
comfortable participating in the process, especially since they are
more likely to have family or friends involved in the system as
criminal defendants. Thus, race and class may have an unintended
effect on this factor as well.
The prior record of the defendant is another seemingly race-
neutral factor considered by prosecutors in the charging and plea
bargaining process. 4 Prosecutors understandably are more likely to
charge and less likely to offer a favorable plea bargain to defendants
with prior arrest and conviction records; defendants who are
18. Id.
19. Davis, supra note 3, at 36.
20. See Davis, supra note 4, at 70; Davis, supra note 3, at 36.
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recidivists are arguably more deserving of prosecution." Race,
however, may affect the existence of a prior criminal record even in
the absence of recidivist tendencies on the part of the suspect
because of racial profiling at the arrest stage of the process.26
Race often plays a role in the decision to detain and/or arrest
a suspect.27 In addition, policy decisions about where police officers
should be deployed and what offenses they should investigate have
racial ramifications. 2 A white defendant with no criminal arrest or
conviction record may have engaged in criminal behavior. If he lives
in a community that resolves certain criminal offenses (drug use,
assault, etc.) without police intervention, he may be a recidivist
without a record. Likewise, a black defendant who lives in a
designated "high crime" area may have been detained and arrested
on numerous occasions even if he has not engaged in criminal
behavior.2 9 Thus, the existence or nonexistence of an arrest or
conviction record may not reflect criminality. A prosecutor without
knowledge of or sensitivity to this issue may give prior arrests undue
consideration in making charging and plea bargaining decisions.
30
The ABA standards also suggest that prosecutors consider
the availability of alternative dispositions before bringing criminal
charges.3 Many prosecutors' offices have diversion programs or other
25. Id.
26. Id. at 36-37.
27. See United States v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 23, 33-34 (D. Mass. 1998)
(acknowledging the relevance of race in traffic stops and arrests); Sean Hecker,
Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for Civilian Review Boards,
28 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 551, 562 n.59 (1997) (referring to an ACLU survey
that found that while minorities make up only 21.8% of violators, they constitute
80.3% of those stopped and searched on Maryland portions of route 1-95); David
Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 953, 976-77 (2002) (critiquing ethnic
profiling for its overbreadth and ineffectiveness).
28. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal Protection, 21 Yale
L. & Pol'y Rev. 53, 56 (2003) (arguing that reactive law enforcement strategies
leave poor, disproportionately minority communities more vulnerable to crime
than wealthy ones).
29. See David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments:
Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 St.
John's L. Rev. 975, 1000 (1998) (addressing the problem of police detentions
based on the person's proximity to a high crime area).
30. See Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 23, 33-34 (holding that, on account of racial
bias, the defendant's prior record would not be considered when determining his
sentence).
31. See ABA, supra note 13, at Standard 3-3.8.
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alternatives that allow for the dismissal of a case combined with
alternative resolutions such as restitution, rehabilitative treatment
or community service.32 Most of these alternatives are available for
first offenders only and benefit not only the defendant but all parties.
The victim may be compensated if restitution is involved, and the
alternatives have the added benefit of eliminating the time and
expense of trying another case for the prosecutor, the defense
attorney, and the court. As with other seemingly legitimate
considerations, however, this factor may have class and race
ramifications. Wealthier defendants have a greater ability to make
restitution or pay for drug, alcohol, or psychiatric treatment. Since
people of color are disproportionately poor,33 this seemingly race
neutral factor can have racial effects.
Arbitrary, unsystematic decision-making, exacerbated by
unconscious race and class predilections, sometimes results in
disparate treatment of similarly situated victims and defendants.
That prosecutors do not intend to cause racial disparities does not
excuse them from responsibility for the harmful effects of their
decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly blocked
efforts to hold prosecutors accountable for unintentional
discrimination.
III. INEFFECTIVE LEGAL REMEDIES
A. Selective Prosecution
When a prosecutor singles out an individual for prosecution
based on his race, religion, or some other inappropriate classification,
she engages in selective prosecution. In Oyler v. Boles, the Supreme
Court held that selective prosecution based on race, religion, or any
other arbitrary classification is unconstitutional only if it is
purposeful or intentional.34 The requirement of an independent
showing of discriminatory purpose was solidified by the Supreme
Court's decision in Washington v. Davis.35 There, the Court required
evidence of discriminatory purpose independent of disproportionate
32. See Thomas & Fitch, supra note 8, at 530.
33. See Davis, supra note 2.
34. Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
35. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 230 (1976).
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impact to prove that a facially neutral law violates the Equal
Protection Clause. 36
In 1985, the Supreme Court applied the strict intent
standard to a selective prosecution case in Wayte v. United States.
37
In Wayte, the defendant was charged with knowingly and willfully
failing to register for the draft.35 Wayte claimed that he had been
selectively prosecuted because of his protests against the draft.3 9 The
Court rejected his claim, holding that, even if there were evidence of
discriminatory impact, Mr. Wayte had to prove that the government
intended to discriminate against him because of his protests. ° The
Court made it clear that a showing of discriminatory impact alone
was not sufficient to prove discriminatory motive." Thus, since
Wayte, defendants must make a prima facie showing of
discriminatory effect and purpose to prove selective prosecution.
The Court has even imposed onerous requirements on
defendants seeking the necessary evidence to make a prima facie
case of selective prosecution. In United States v. Armstrong,42 the
defendants filed a discovery motion to obtain evidence from a
prosecutor about his office's prosecution practices.43 The case
involved African-American defendants in Los Angeles who were
charged in federal court with crack cocaine and firearms offenses.'
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for selective
prosecution based on evidence that the U.S. Attorney prosecuted
virtually all African Americans charged with crack offenses in federal
court, but left all white crack defendants to be prosecuted in state
court.: 5 Since the federal law penalized crack distribution much more
36. Id. at 241-42.
37. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608-09 (1985).
38. Id. at 603.
39. Id. at 604.
40. Id. at 608-10.
41. Id. at 608-09.
42. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
43. Id. at 459.
44. Id. at 458-59.
45. See Dan Weikel, U.S. Defends Handling Of Crack Cases, L.A. Times,
May 26, 1995, at A3 (noting that "[vlirtually all whites arrested for crack offenses
have been prosecuted in state court, where the penalties are less severe."); Gary
Webb, War On Drugs' Unequal Impact On U.S. Blacks, San Jose Mercury News,
Aug. 20, 1996, at Al; Gary Webb, Flawed Sentencing Blamed For Disparity, San
Jose Mercury News, Aug. 20, 1996, at All.
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harshly than California state law,46 this decision by the federal
prosecutor resulted in African Americans receiving harsher
punishment than their white counterparts charged with the same
criminal conduct.
The defendants' discovery motion requested the U.S.
Attorney's criteria for deciding whether to bring charges in federal
court, as well as the number and racial identity of all defendants
charged with crack offenses in both federal court and state court. The
prosecutor opposed the discovery motion, noting that the facts of the
case met the office's criteria for prosecution and denying the
allegation of selective prosecution based on race.47 However, the
prosecution neither admitted nor denied the claim that there were no
federal prosecutions of white defendants charged with these
offenses.48
The district court granted the defendants' motion, ordering
the government to provide very general information: (1) a list of all
cases from the last three years in which the government charged
both cocaine and firearms offenses, (2) the race of the defendants in
those cases, (3) the levels of law enforcement involved in the
investigations of those cases, and (4) the criteria for deciding to
prosecute those defendants for federal cocaine offenses.4 9 The U.S.
Attorney went to remarkable lengths to avoid turning over the
requested information, yet offered no explanation of why providing
the discovery would prejudice the government's case.5 ° The
defendants did not request specific information about cases, and so
confidentiality and other privacy concerns were not at issue. The U.S.
Attorney first appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
When the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court,51 the prosecutors
appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Here, they finally found support. The Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit decision, holding that to be entitled to
46. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2006) (requiring a sentence of 10 years
under federal law); Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 11351-11351.5 (West 1991)
(establishing a penalty of two to five years for distribution of cocaine under state
law).
47. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 459.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 460-61.
51. United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1510 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd
en banc, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
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discovery in selective prosecution cases based on race, a defendant
must produce credible evidence that similarly situated defendants of
other races could have been prosecuted but were not. 2 The Court
held that Armstrong and his co-defendants did not meet this
threshold requirement. 3  The Court noted that in selective
prosecution cases, the claimant must show discriminatory effect and
purpose. To establish discriminatory effect, the claimant must show
that "similarly situated individuals of a different race were not
prosecuted."54 In other words, the Court placed the burden of
demonstrating selective prosecution on the defendants, making that
burden extremely heavy.
The Armstrong Court, in seemingly defensive language, took
great pains to explain why a defendant's burden in a selective
prosecution case is not impossible to meet. In explaining the
requirements for making out a prima facie case, the Court noted:
The similarly situated requirement does not make a
selective-prosecution claim impossible to prove. Twenty
years before Ah Sin, we invalidated an ordinance, also
adopted by San Francisco, that prohibited the operation of
laundries in wooden buildings. The plaintiff in error
successfully demonstrated that the ordinance was applied
against Chinese nationals but not against other laundry-
shop operators. The authorities had denied the applications
of 200 Chinese subjects for permits to operate shops in
wooden buildings, but granted the applications of 80
individuals who were not Chinese subjects to operate
laundries in wooden buildings "under similar conditions."
55
The Court's reliance upon Yick Wo v. Hopkins,56 a case
decided in 1886, as evidence that the selective prosecution standard
is not impossible to meet, speaks volumes. After addressing the
requirements for the prima facie selective prosecution case, the Court
went on to discuss the rigorous showing for obtaining discovery in
such cases, expressing concern that providing discovery would be
burdensome for prosecutors:
52. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469-70 (1996).
53. Id. at 465.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 465-66 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886))
(internal citations omitted).
56. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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Discovery thus imposes many of the costs present when the
Government must respond to a prima facie case of selective
prosecution. It will divert prosecutors' resources and may
disclose the Government's prosecutorial strategy. The
justifications for a rigorous standard for the elements of a
selective-prosecution claim thus require a correspondingly
rigorous standard for discovery in aid of such a claim. The
parties, and the Courts of Appeals which have considered
the requisite showing to establish entitlement to discovery,
describe this showing with a variety of phrases .... The
Courts of Appeals "require some evidence tending to show
the existence of the essential elements of the defense,"
discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent.
57
The Court provided no guidance on what would be sufficient
to meet the vague "some evidence" requirement,58 other than to note
that the evidence presented by the defendants in Armstrong was not
enough.
Even if there were a way to produce "some evidence" that
similarly situated defendants could have been prosecuted-private
investigators looking for white drug dealers perhaps-how many
criminal defendants could afford such an undertaking? The Court
ignored the fact that the vast majority of criminal defendants are
indigent.59 The efforts made by public defenders in the Armstrong
case were extraordinary considering the resource constraints of most
public defender offices. Most criminal defendants simply cannot
afford to produce the additional evidence required in Armstrong,
assuming it could be found-a fact the Court left unaddressed.
B. McCleskey v. Kemp - Statistics Are Not Enough
The Armstrong decision was soundly criticized by lawyers
and scholars. 60 Despite the Court's proclamation that selective
57. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468-69 (1996) (quoting




60. See generally Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution:
Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 605 (1998) (arguing
that the Armstrong rule's evidentiary standard ensures that meritorious claims
will never be proven); Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 357-59 (1997)
(noting that Armstrong illustrates the judicial system's hostility to challenges to
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prosecution is not impossible to prove, after Armstrong, obtaining
discovery for such claims seemed as difficult as prevailing on the
merits. And the case shed no light on how a defendant might go
about meeting the onerous standard. Nine years before Armstrong
was decided, the Court addressed prosecutorial discretion and racial
disparity in another context: the implementation of the death
penalty. McCleskey v. Kemp,6' one of the Court's most controversial
decisions, similarly left lawyers and scholars in a fog about how one
might ever prove racial discrimination by prosecutors.62
Warren McCleskey was a black man convicted of armed
robbery and murder of a white police officer in the state of Georgia in
1978. The prosecutor sought the death penalty, and the jury
sentenced McCleskey to death. During one of his post-conviction
appeals in federal district court, McCleskey claimed that the
administration of the Georgia capital punishment system violated
the Equal Protection Clause because African-American defendants
and defendants charged with killing whites were more likely to
receive the death penalty than other defendants.
McCleskey's claim was based on a statistical analysis
conducted by Professor David Baldus of the University of Iowa Law
School. The study examined the implementation of the death penalty
in the state of Georgia during the 1970s in over 2,000 murder cases.
Professor Baldus found that defendants charged with killing white
persons received the death penalty in eleven percent of these cases,
but defendants charged with killing blacks received the death
prosecutorial discretion); Marc Price Wolf, Proving Race Discrimination in
Criminal Cases Using Statistical Evidence, 4 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 395,
416 (2007) (arguing that Armstrong sets up a "Catch-22" scenario for defendants
in proving selective prosecution because "in order to first obtain the necessary
evidence which would allow them to establish a claim of selective prosecution,
they must first present the court with some evidence tending to show the
existence of a selective prosecution claim").
61. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
62. See Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital
Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388, 1401 (1988)
(explaining how the Court recognized that statistical disparities such as those
found in the Baldus study may create a prima facie case that shifts onto the state
the burden of rebutting allegations of racial discrimination, but still required
exceptionally clear proof in capital cases before inferring that discretion was
abused).
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penalty in only one percent of the cases. 63 Baldus also divided the
cases according to the race of the defendant and the race of the
victim. He found that the defendants received the death penalty in
twenty-two percent of the cases involving black defendants and white
victims, eight percent of the cases involving white defendants and
white victims, one percent of the cases involving black defendants
and black victims, and three percent of the cases involving white
defendants and black victims.6
Because prosecutors are in charge of the administration of
the death penalty, the study necessarily implied that prosecutors
were at least partially responsible for the racial disparities in
Georgia's capital punishment system. Baldus found that prosecutors
sought the death penalty in seventy percent of the cases involving
black defendants and white victims, thirty-two percent of the cases
involving white defendants and white victims, fifteen percent of the
cases involving black defendants and black victims, and nineteen
percent of the cases involving white defendants and black victims.
65
The district court rejected McCleskey's claim, as did the U.S.
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
accepted the validity of the Baldus study but held that there was no
constitutional violation.66 According to the Court, McCleskey was not
entitled to relief because the Baldus study did not prove that the
decision-makers in his case intended to discriminate against him
because of his race.67
Since the Court did not question the accuracy of the Baldus
study, it was clear that the Court was unwilling to accept statistical
studies as proof of intentional discrimination by prosecutors. The
McCleskey Court described Yick Wo v. Hopkins as one of the "rare
cases in which a statistical pattern of discriminatory impact
demonstrated a constitutional violation,"6 8 presumably because the
statistics in Yick Wo were so stark. But the Court's primary reason
for rejecting McCleskey's claim seemed to focus, not on the need for
63. David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An
Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 661
(1983).
64. Id.; see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987).
65. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.
66. Id. at 292 n.7.
67. Id. at 292-93.
68. Id. at 293 n.12.
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additional proof, but on its aversion to challenging the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. According to the Court, "the policy
considerations behind a prosecutor's traditionally 'wide discretion'
suggest the impropriety of our requiring prosecutors to defend their
decisions to seek death penalties, 'often years after they were
made.' 69 The Court further noted:
"[IIf the prosecutor could be made to answer in court each
time... a person charged him with wrongdoing, his energy
and attention would be diverted from the pressing duty of
enforcing the criminal law." Our refusal to require that the
prosecutor provide an explanation for his decisions in this
case is completely consistent with this Court's longstanding
precedents that hold that a prosecutor need not explain his
decisions unless the criminal defendant presents a prima
facie case of unconstitutional conduct with respect to his
case.
70
While the majority opinion roundly endorsed a "hands off"
approach to prosecutorial discretion, the dissenting opinions provided
powerful critiques of this approach. Justice Brennan's dissent argued
that the absence of guidelines governing the prosecutor's decision to
seek the death penalty provided substantial opportunity for racial
considerations, even if subtle or unconscious, to influence the
charging decision.7 As for the majority's exhortations about the
importance of prosecutorial discretion, Justice Brennan stated that
"[w]hen confronted with evidence that race more likely than not
plays such a role in a capital sentencing system, it is plainly
insufficient to say that the importance of discretion demands that the
risk be higher before we will act-for in such a case the very end that
discretion is designed to serve is being undermined."72
Justice Blackmun wrote a separate dissent that focused on
the prosecutor's role in the process to an even greater degree than
Justice Brennan's dissent.73 Blackmun noted that the prosecutor is
the primary decision-maker at each stage of the death penalty
process and analyzed the evidence of abuse of discretion by the
69. Id. at 296.
70. Id. at 296 n.18 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 425-26 (1976)).
71. Id. at 333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 336.
73. Id. at 345 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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District Attorney in McCleskey.74 Justice Blackmun cited the
prosecutor's deposition, during which the prosecutor had
acknowledged that there were no guidelines for when to seek the
death penalty and that "the only guidance given was on-the-job
training."75 According to the Fulton County District Attorney,
individual prosecutors made the death penalty decisions regarding
their cases and were not even required to report these decisions to
him.76 Justice Blackmun noted the significance of the race of the
victim at various stages of prosecutorial decision-making and urged
the establishment of guidelines that might provide some procedural
safeguards at these early stages of the criminal process.77
Wayte, McCleskey, and Armstrong share a common
resounding theme: the Supreme Court is strongly inclined to defer to
prosecutors in the exercise of their discretion. Although the Court
purports to provide a remedy for race discrimination in the exercise
of prosecutorial duties, it provides little to no guidance on what proof
might be sufficient to obtain relief. The proof was sufficient in Yick
Wo but insufficient in Armstrong and McCleskey. Continued
litigation of this issue is a crapshoot with very bad odds, and
remedies must be pursued elsewhere.7 8
IV. REFORM MEASURES
Given the inadequacy of current legal remedies and the
Court's affirmation of broad prosecutorial discretion, advocates for
racial justice must consider other solutions. As noted earlier,
prosecutors frequently make race neutral charging and plea
bargaining decisions that produce racial disparities. 79 At the same
74. Id. at 350.
75. Id. at 357.
76. Id. at 357-58.
77. Id. at 356, 365.
78. The McCleskey court itself suggested that legislatures should attempt
to resolve the issue of racial disparity in the implementation of the death penalty.
Id. at 319 (majority opinion) ("[1legislatures also are better qualified to weigh and
'evaluate the results of statistical studies'" (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 186 (1976))). Since McCleskey, the U.S. Congress and several states have
sought to enact Racial Justice Acts to permit capital defendants to use statistical
evidence to show that race influenced the decision to seek the death penalty in
their cases. So far, only the state of Kentucky has enacted such a law. See Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.300 (1996).
79. See supra Part II.
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time, because of their immense power and discretion, prosecutors are
uniquely positioned and empowered to remedy these injustices.
Not every disparity is evidence of discrimination. Since many
legitimate factors affect prosecutorial decisions, it may be
appropriate to treat victims and defendants differently, even in
similar cases. A prerequisite to eliminating race discrimination in the
criminal process is the determination of whether the dissimilar
treatment of similarly situated persons is based on race rather than
some legitimate reason. Whether the treatment is unintentional or
purposeful is immaterial-the goal should be elimination of
unwarranted disparities.
Prosecutors currently have the ability to make significant
progress towards the elimination of unwarranted racial disparity in
the criminal justice system without litigation or legislation. Racial
impact studies along with racial and ethnic task forces could produce
some success with the cooperation and leadership of prosecutors.
A. Racial Impact Studies"°
Racial impact studies should be conducted in prosecutors'
offices to discover and eliminate any racially discriminatory
treatment of defendants and victims. These studies would involve the
collection of data on the race of the defendant and victim for each
category of offense and the status of the case at each step of the
prosecutorial process .8 For example, in each case, the prosecutor
would document the race of the defendant, the defendant's criminal
history, the initial charging decision, each plea offer made, accepted,
or rejected, and the sentence advocated by the prosecutor. 2 If
relevant, the prosecutor would also document whether and how a
decision was made to charge in federal versus state court.8 3 The
statistics would be collected for each type of offense so that an
appropriate statistical analysis comparing the disposition of the
80. I originally proposed the ideas in this section in Angela J. Davis,
Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 Fordham L. Rev.
13, 54-56 (1998).
81. Id. at 54.
82. Davis, supra note 4, at 187.
83. Id. at 188.
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cases of white defendants and victims with those of similarly situated
defendants and victims of color could be performed.8 4
These studies should be published and widely disseminated
to the general public for the purpose of forcing prosecutors to
acknowledge that their decisions contribute to racial disparities in
the system." The studies would assure that the issue is addressed by
prosecutors in the electoral process and would provide additional
information to the public about the extent to which the elimination of
racial disparity is a prosecutorial priority.86
Racial impact studies would not only be helpful in
determining whether defendants of color receive harsher treatment
for the same criminal behavior, but would also demonstrate whether
cases involving white victims were prosecuted more vigorously than
cases involving victims of color. 7 The data also would indicate
whether similarly situated defendants and victims of different races
are treated the same at each step of the process. 88 Are defendants in
cases involving white victims initially charged with the same offense
as similarly situated defendants in cases involving black victims? Do
they receive comparable plea offers? Do prosecutors advocate for the
same dispositions at the sentencing hearings? The collection of this
data would provide answers to these questions.89
The data may help to reveal the extent to which people of
color are being arrested with disproportionate frequency. 90 If the
majority of the cases in any particular category of offense involve
defendants of color, the prosecutor should investigate further to
determine whether people of color comprise a majority of the
84. Id.
85. Id. at 187; Davis, supra note 3, at 54.
86. Davis, supra note 4, at 188.
87. Id.; Davis, supra note 3, at 54.
88. For purposes of the report, "similarly situated" defendants would have
committed the same criminal act and have similar criminal histories. "Similarly
situated" victims would have the same level of interest in prosecution and similar
criminal histories. Other characteristics of either the defendant or the victim
(wealth, education, jury appeal, etc.) should not be relevant to the prosecutor's
calculus, as they would involve discriminatory treatment based on criteria
inapplicable to a study focusing simply on the racial impact of prosecutorial
decisions. Whether those criteria are present or not in prosecutorial decisions is
immaterial to the empirical question of the extent of racially disparate outcomes
resulting from prosecutorial decision-making.
89. Davis, supra note 4, at 187; Davis, supra note 3, at 55.
90. Davis, supra note 4, at 188; Davis, supra note 3, at 55.
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population in that jurisdiction.9' If people of color are involved in the
offenses at a rate disproportionate to their representation in the
jurisdiction, further investigation would certainly be warranted to
determine whether people of color actually commit the crime in
question at greater rates than whites. 92 The absence of credible
evidence of disproportionate criminality should create a rebuttable
presumption of racial bias in the arrest process.93
A sophisticated statistical analysis, of the sort provided by
the Baldus study, is also needed.94 Similar studies in prosecutors'
offices would determine whether racial disparities exist in the
prosecution of all types of cases and whether the disparities are
statistically significant such that they create a necessary inference of
discriminatory treatment on the basis of race.95 A scientific study
would be essential to the credibility of the evaluation because there
are so many legitimate, nonracial factors that may be considered in
prosecutorial decisions.96 This type of evaluation would shed light on
whether, and to what extent, disparate treatment of similarly
situated victims and defendants is based on race. 97
In order to influence prosecutorial behavior, racial impact
studies must be published and widely disseminated. 98 These studies
would inform the public about the possible discriminatory effects of
prosecution policies and practices. 99 They would force a public debate
about racial disparities and compel prosecutors to be truly
accountable to their constituents.'00 Prosecutors could do this by
either establishing policies and practices to help eliminate the
disparities or by explaining that there are legitimate, race-neutral
91. Davis, supra note 3, at 55.
92. Id.
93. The prosecutor should not use conviction and sentencing rates as
evidence of criminality, as the Supreme Court did in Armstrong. As Justice
Stevens noted in his dissent in Armstrong, conviction and sentencing rates only
reflect the number of individuals prosecuted and sentenced for certain crimes, not
necessarily the number of individuals who committed these crimes. Armstrong,
517 U.S 456, 482 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Davis, supra note 4, at 188; Davis, supra note 3, at 55.
95. Davis, supra note 3, at 55-56.
96. Id.
97. Davis, supra note 4, at 188.
98. Id; Davis, supra note 3, at 56.
99. Davis, supra note 4, at 188.
100. Id; Davis, supra note 3, at 59.
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reasons for such disparities.' 1 If the public were not satisfied with
efforts to eliminate the disparities or the prosecutor's explanation for
disparities, it could remove the prosecutor from office through the
electoral process. 2 The public debate would also enable willing
prosecutors to establish workable remedial policies and practices.
10 3
Thus, public access to the studies would motivate prosecutors to
correct inequities and help to make the electoral process a more
meaningful check on unacceptable prosecutorial practices.1
0 4
B. Criminal Justice Racial and Ethnic Task Forces
Discretionary decisions that contribute to racial disparity are
made at every step of the criminal justice process and are cumulative
at each of these steps. Effective solutions should involve officials and
stakeholders at every stage of the process as well as policymakers,
legislators, and interested members of the community. Task forces
comprised of the chief decision-makers at each stage would be
situated to identify and eliminate many of the discriminatory effects
of race-neutral decision-making.
In August 2004, the ABA Justice Kennedy Commission105
issued a report to the ABA House of Delegates that recommended the
formation of Criminal Justice Racial and Ethnic Task Forces.'0 6
Specifically, the Commission recommended that task forces:
1) design and conduct studies to determine the extent of
racial and ethnic disparity in the various stages of criminal
investigation, prosecution, disposition and sentencing; 2)
make periodic public reports on the results of their studies;
and 3) make specific recommendations intended to
eliminate racial and ethnic discrimination and unjustified
racial and ethnic disparities.
10 7
101. Davis, supra note 4, at 188-89; Davis, supra note 3, at 59.
102. Davis, supra note 4, at 189; Davis, supra note 3, at 59-60.
103. Davis, supra note 4, at 189. Davis, supra note 3, at 60.
104. Davis, supra note 3, at 60.
105. Now called the ABA Commission on Effective Criminal Sanctions. See
ABA Commission on Effective Criminal Sanctions, http://www.abanet.org/dch/
committee.cfm?com=CR209800 (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
106. ABA, Justice Kennedy Commission, Reports with Recommendations
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The ABA adopted this recommendation and it is now ABA policy.
Prosecutors should take a leadership role in establishing
such task forces in their communities. These task forces should
conduct comprehensive studies of criminal justice systems to
determine whether there are racial disparities at each stage, to
establish the cause of these disparities, and to recommend and
implement concrete strategies to eliminate them. Although these
studies require the participation of key high-level officials, the most
significant determinant of their effectiveness will be the chief
prosecutor's willingness to provide access to internal prosecution
data, enabling the task force to determine whether there are racial
differences in charging and plea bargaining decisions.
The Monroe County Racial Justice Task Force provides an
example of how the criminal justice officials in one community
addressed racial disparity in their criminal justice system."' 8 The
Monroe County NAACP and the Unitarian Universalist Church in
Bloomington, Indiana, spearheaded the effort. 0 9 They first issued a
preliminary report that documented the racial disparity in the
county's criminal justice system before organizing a task force to
address the problem."0 Participants in the task force included
officials from the District Attorney's Office, the Police Department,
the Deputy Sheriffs Office, the Monroe County Circuit Court, the
local NAACP, and the Unitarian Universalist Church. Graduate
students from the Criminal Justice Department of Indiana
University agreed to provide research assistance and data
collection.''
The Monroe County Racial Justice Task Force sought
technical assistance from The Sentencing Project, a nationally
recognized non-profit organization that promotes alternatives to
incarceration and more effective and humane criminal justice
policies." 12 The Executive Director of the Sentencing Project, Marc
108. Monroe County Racial Justice Task Force Study Committee, Monroe
County, Indiana, Race and Criminal Justice in Monroe County, Indiana: 2003
Report from the Monroe County Racial Justice Task Force (2003), available at
http://www.bloomington.in.us/-mcbnaacp/assets/2003_RacialJusticeTaskForce
_Report.pdf.
109. Id. at i.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 54.
112. Id. at 11. See The Sentencing Project, http://www.sentencingproject.
org (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
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Mauer, along with Dennis Schrantz, provided technical assistance to
the Monroe County Task Force.'1 3 The Monroe County Task Force
sought guidance from a manual co-authored by Mauer and Schrantz
entitled Reducing Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System-
A Manual for Practitioners and Policymakers."14 This manual
provides a step-by-step research design to assist communities in
identifying and addressing racial disparity and served as a guide for
the Monroe County Task Force." 5 The Task Force completed its work
and published the completed report in October 2003.
The participation and commitment of the chief prosecutor for
Monroe County was critical to the success of the Task Force.
Although he was not legally required to do so, he provided the
necessary access to files and records in his office and participated
fully in the process.' 16 The Task Force included the key decision-
makers at every step of the process with the power and discretion to
change practices and policies that were perpetuating unwarranted
racial disparities. However, because the charging and plea
bargaining decisions guide the process and often pre-determine the
outcome of criminal cases, the Task Force could not have succeeded
without the chief prosecutor's full cooperation.
C. The Prosecutorial Response 1 7
The elimination of discrimination is totally consistent with
the responsibility of the prosecutor to seek justice, not simply win
convictions." 8 The duty to seek justice is not limited to the
113. Monroe County Racial Justice Task Force Study Committee, supra
note 108, at 11. Mauer was Assistant Director of the Task Force at the time the
report was issued.
114. Id.; The Sentencing Project, Reducing Racial Disparity in the
Criminal Justice System-A Manual for Practitioners and Policymakers (2000),
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/publications/rd
reducingrdmanual.pdf.
115. Monroe County Racial Justice Task Force Study Committee, supra
note 108, at 11.
116. Id. at 12 ("The Monroe County Prosecutor agreed to provide access to
all files included in the study, thereby laying the foundation for collection of more
data.").
117. I originally proposed the ideas in this section in Angela J. Davis,
Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor 189-91 (Oxford
University Press 2007).
118. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (arguing that the
interest of the prosecutor "is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
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prosecutor's responsibilities in individual cases, but also applies to
the administration of justice in the criminal justice system as a
whole. In fact, the prosecutor's duties include the oversight function
of ensuring fairness and efficiency in the criminal justice system.
119
Those duties should include recognizing injustice in the system and
initiating corrective measures.
120
Nonetheless, it is likely that a substantial number of
prosecutors will oppose racial impact studies and Criminal Justice
Racial and Ethnic Task Forces. Some will believe there is no need for
reform.' 2' Others may believe that there is always room for
improvement, but disagree with the suggested strategies for
reform-particularly the requirement that prosecutors provide access
to data.122 Each of these proposals requires prosecutors to disclose
information they would not otherwise be required to disclose by
law.' 23 Some prosecutors will undoubtedly resist these efforts for the
done."); ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993) ("The duty of
the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict."); Model Rules of ProflI
Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1990) (describing a prosecutor's responsibilities "to see
that [a] defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon
the basis of sufficient evidence."); Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 7-13
(1981) ("The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual
advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.").
119. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial
Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 45, 57 (1991) (noting that
among other responsibilities, a prosecutor has a duty to further the state's need
for a criminal justice system that is efficient and that appears fair).
120. See ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 3-1.2(d) (3d ed. 1993) ("It is an
important function of the prosecutor to seek to reform and improve the
administration of criminal justice. When inadequacies or injustices in the
substantive or procedural law come to the prosecutor's attention, he or she should
stimulate efforts for remedial action."); Model Rules of Prof l Conduct pmbl. 5
(1990) ("A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of
justice . . . ."); Model Code of Prof l Responsibility EC 8-1 (1981) ("[L]awyers are
especially qualified to recognize deficiencies in the legal system and to initiate
corrective measures therein. Thus they should participate in proposing and
supporting legislation and programs to improve the system. . . ."); see also id. EC
8-9 ("The advancement of our legal system is of vital importance in maintaining
the rule of law and in facilitating orderly changes; therefore, lawyers should
encourage, and should aid in making, needed changes and improvements.").
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same reasons they have resisted the discovery of their internal
decisions in the past.
124
Criticisms of both strategies would undoubtedly echo the
Supreme Court's reasons for deferring to prosecutorial discretion in
Wayte v. United States.125 For example, prosecutors may claim that
the publication of this information will have a chilling effect on law
enforcement efforts. 26 This argument suggests that prosecutors
would be hesitant to prosecute certain cases if they believe that
members of the public, criminal defendants, or victims would
question their decisions.1 2 7 Thus, according to this argument, some
criminal activity will not be prosecuted. 2 However, the goal of the
publication of the studies is not to chill appropriate and fair law
enforcement, but to totally eliminate unfair, discriminatory law
enforcement.1 29 To the extent that law enforcement tactics or
prosecutorial policies involve misconduct or discriminate based on
race, they should not merely be chilled-they should be entirely
eliminated.13 ° The reports and studies, and the knowledge that they
will be published, should cause prosecutors to be more careful and
meticulous in making decisions. They should motivate prosecutors to
follow ethical rules and assure that similarly situated victims and
defendants are treated equitably.'
13
The Supreme Court's concern that judicial interference with
prosecutorial discretion would undermine prosecutorial effectiveness
should not apply to the publication of these reports or studies.3 2 The
Supreme Court was concerned that if criminals were aware of how
and under what circumstances cases are prosecuted, they would
adjust their behavior to avoid prosecution. 3 3 For example, if it were
common knowledge that a prosecution office had a policy of only
prosecuting cases involving more than five grams of cocaine, dealers
and users would distribute or possess quantities less than five
124. Id.
125. See id. at 189-90; Davis, supra note 3, at 62.
126. Davis, supra note 4, at 190; Davis, supra note 3, at 63.
127. Davis, supra note 4, at 190-91; Davis, supra note 3, at 63.
128. Davis, supra note 4, at 191; Davis, supra note 3, at 63.
129. Davis, supra note 4, at 191; Davis, supra note 3, at 64.
130. Davis, supra note 3, at 64.
131. Davis, supra note 4, at 190; Davis, supra note 3, at 62.
132. Davis, supra note 4, at 190; Davis, supra note 3, at 62.
133. Davis, supra note 3, at 62.
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grams. 34 The publication of task force reports and racial impact
studies would not create this problem because the studies would not
reveal specific law enforcement policies. 3 5 The information in these
studies and reports would be limited to general demographic data.
13 6
Prosecutors would also understandably be concerned about
the time and resources necessary to implement these strategies.1
37
The prosecutor's primary function is law enforcement; any
undertaking which substantially interferes with that responsibility
would be subject to legitimate criticism. 38 In the case of racial impact
studies, for example, if the collection of data were a tedious process
that substantially interfered with the performance of important
prosecutorial duties, most prosecutors would object to the studies.13 9
Prosecutors, however, could collect the relevant information in an
efficient, non-intrusive manner. Prosecutors' offices could create
forms with checklists on which the prosecutors could quickly and
easily note the relevant information. 40 Most prosecutors routinely
make written entries in case files whenever an action is taken in a
particular case.' 4 'These forms or checklists could be kept in the same
case file and would involve no more time than the routine case file
entries. The only difference would be the type of information and the
format for its collection. The information also might be collected
electronically in an equally efficient manner.1
42
Time is not the only relevant factor. Few prosecutors' offices
would have the expertise or resources to perform the necessary
statistical analysis of the collected data for racial impact studies.
43
For that reason, the organized bar should help to secure these
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 64; Davis, supra note 4, at 191. See also Wayte v. United States,
470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (expressing concern that inquiry into prosecutorial
decision-making would reveal enforcement policies and permit criminals to
modify their behavior to avoid prosecution).
137. Davis, supra note 4, at 190; see Davis, supra note 3, at 62.
138. Davis, supra note 3, at 62.
139. Id.
140. See Thomas & Fitch, supra note 8, 523-24 (advocating that
prosecutors use forms and checklists to record the basis of their charging
decisions).
141. Davis, supra note 4, at 190; Davis, supra note 3, at 63.
142. Davis, supra note 4, at 190.
143. Id.
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resources.14 One possible solution to the resource problem may be
the volunteer efforts of local colleges and universities.' 45 Criminology
and criminal justice departments may be willing to conduct such
research and would provide a wealth of resources through the use of
graduate students from various departments. 46 The studies would
provide a great public service as well as a rich academic experience
for professors, scholars, and students.4 7 Use of university resources
would also give the project the objectivity that would be lacking if the
project were conducted by the prosecutors themselves. 1
48
In light of potential prosecutorial opposition, legislation may
be necessary to enforce these reforms. '4' The Racial and Ethnic Task
Forces may be more acceptable to some prosecutors than the racial
impact studies because they involve the cooperation of key decision-
makers at every stage of the process and do not place total
responsibility on prosecutors. However, resistance to each proposal
should be anticipated. Although state and local bar associations and
other interested groups should meet with prosecutors' offices to
discuss and address their concerns, these groups should be prepared
to work together in support of enforcement legislation, if necessary. 5 °
D. A Model Reform Effort'
In 2005, the Vera Institute of Justice'5 2 established the
Prosecution and Racial Justice Project with the goal of helping
prosecutors "manage the exercise of discretion within their offices in
a manner that reduces the risk of racial disparity in the decision-
144. Davis, supra note 4, at 190.
145. Id.; Davis, supra note 3, at 63.
146. Davis, supra note 3, at 63.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Davis, supra note 4, at 191.
150. Id.
151. The Model Reform Effort discussed in this section was originally
presented in Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American
Prosecutor 192-94 (Oxford University Press 2007).
152. "The Vera Institute of Justice works closely with leaders in
government and civil society to improve the services people rely on for safety and
justice. Vera develops innovative, affordable programs that often grow into self-
sustaining organizations, studies social problems and current responses, and
provides practical advice and assistance to government officials in New York and
around the world." Vera Institute of Justice, Missions and Origins, http'//www.
vera.org/about/about_2.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2007).
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making process. ""' 3 This project's methodology is similar to that of
the aforementioned racial impact studies. It involves the collection of
data in prosecutors' offices to determine whether similarly situated
defendants are treated differently at the charging and plea
bargaining stages of the process in ways that reflect unconscious
racial bias.'5 4 This ground-breaking project was made possible in
large part by the willingness of three chief prosecutors to grant Vera
Institute staff broad access to their offices in order to track decision-
making at key discretion points.'55
These prosecutors-Peter Gilchrist of Charlotte, North
Carolina, Paul Morrison of Johnson County, Kansas, and Michael
McCann of Milwaukee, Wisconsin-all enjoy excellent reputations
among other prosecutors and in their local jurisdictions.'5 6 Other
factors that made these prosecutors ideal candidates for the project
included the location of their offices and the demographics of their
communities. 5 7 Yet, each of the prosecutors easily could have
declined the offer to participate in the project. It is a time-consuming
and invasive effort, and there are no obvious political benefits.
158
Nonetheless, each prosecutor decided to accept the offer to
participate because of their commitment to fairness and racial
justice.'5 9
The Vera Institute staff began their work in Peter Gilchrist's
office in Charlotte, North Carolina. 160 The first challenge was to
assure staff prosecutors and support staff that the purpose of the
project was not to assign blame for racial disparities, but to assist
153. Vera Institute of Justice, Prosecution and Racial Justice Project
Overview, http://www.vera.org/project/projectl-l.asp?section-id=8&project-id=78
(last visited Oct. 20, 2007).
154. See Davis, supra note 4, at 192.
155. Id. at 192-94.; Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 153.
156. Since the project's inception, Michael McCann has retired, but has
committed to continue supporting the project along with his successor, John
Chisholm. Paul Morrison participated in the project until he was elected Attorney
General in 2006. Bonnie Dumanis, the District Attorney of San Diego, replaced
Morrison.
157. Davis, supra note 4, at 192. Because each community has a racially
diverse population, one would not expect members of any particular race or
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them in their shared goal of enforcing the law effectively and fairly.
161
A number of key factors assisted the Vera staff in building a
relationship of trust with the prosecution staff. 62 One of the most
important factors was the leadership of the project director, Wayne
McKenzie.' 63 Mr. McKenzie was an experienced prosecutor in the
Kings County (Brooklyn, New York) District Attorney's Office who
took a leave of absence from his office to direct the Prosecution and
Racial Justice Project at Vera. 1' His leadership provided the project
with the credibility and trust necessary to secure the support and
buy-in of the prosecutors involved in the project. He also may help
persuade other prosecutors to agree to similar projects in their
offices. 165 Another important factor that helped to secure support for
the project was the knowledge that the data collection and
management system that Vera would implement for the purpose of
discovering possible bias also would be a useful tool for prosecutors
and other staff as they worked to manage their caseloads and
measure general outcomes in their offices.
66
The most important difference between the previously
proposed racial impact studies and the Vera Institute's Prosecution
and Racial Justice Project is how the collected information will be
used. A key component to the success of racial impact studies is the
publication of the studies. 67 The purpose of these studies is not only
to inform prosecutors of how unconscious bias may affect their
decision-making, but also to inform the general public. 168 However,
the Vera Institute prosecutors agreed to participate in the project
with the understanding that they would voluntarily address any
findings of unconscious bias and make their own decisions about






164. Id. See also Vera Institute of Justice, Prosecution and Racial Justice
Project Staff, http://www.vera.org/projectlprojectl-4.asp?section-id=8&project-id
=78&subsectionid=50 (last visited Oct. 20, 2007) (biography of Wayne
McKenzie).
165. Davis, supra note 4, at 192-93.




THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR
The Prosecution and Racial Justice Project will certainly, at a
minimum, make some progress towards addressing unintended bias
in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these three offices.1 70 If
the project reveals bias, the prosecutors are committed to taking
steps to address it.1 7 1 Solutions would vary, depending on how and at
what stage of the process the bias occurs. The project's findings
would advance the development of policies and practices to eliminate
or reduce unwarranted disparities based on unconscious bias.
1 7
1
The main limitation of the project is its dependency upon the
voluntary efforts of the prosecutors themselves. 73 Although these
three prosecutors are committed to eliminating bias in the decision-
making process, they may or may not choose to reveal the project's
findings to the general public. Nonetheless, the project has great
potential for inspiring similar data collection projects in prosecutors'
offices throughout the nation with the encouragement and leadership
of the three prosecutors involved in the project. 7 4 Their standing in
the prosecution community provides them with the credibility to
persuade other prosecutors to take similar voluntary action.'7 5 They
might also be instrumental in helping to establish policies and
practices that the National District Attorneys Association and other
national prosecution organizations may endorse and promote to their
membership.
1 76
The Vera Institute's Prosecution and Racial Justice Project
will be completed in 2008.177 Whether or not the data collected in
each office demonstrates evidence of unconscious bias, the project
should inspire similar efforts in other prosecutors' offices if it proves
beneficial to the offices involved.1 7 8 However, without the leadership
of the project's chief prosecutors and/or the publication of the
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V. CONCLUSION
Efforts to eliminate racial discrimination and unwarranted
racial disparities in the criminal justice system must involve
prosecutors. Although the Supreme Court has not required
prosecutors to reveal information about their charging and plea
bargaining decisions, prosecutors must be willing to provide access to
this information to discover how race neutral decision-making can
produce unjustifiable racial effects. Such data are a necessary
prerequisite to the formulation of strategies for the elimination of
unwarranted racial disparities in the criminal justice system. The
efforts of the American Bar Association and the Vera Institute are an
important beginning to what will hopefully become a trend of
prosecutors taking a leadership role in promoting fairness and
eliminating unjustifiable racial disparities in the criminal justice
system.
